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THE PHYSICIAN, THE LAW, AND THE

DRUG ABUSER
W

,iIAM C. WR1ITFORD t

The rapid expansion of illegal drug use, particularly among white
middle and upper class youth, has induced governments at all levels to
review their laws and policies regarding drug abuse. In many cases
these reviews have produced policy changes resulting in less exclusive
reliance on the traditional punitive, or law-enforcement, approach to
drug abuse problems, and greater reliance on a balanced approach which
increases the emphasis on treatment and rehabilitation of illegal drug
users.' For example, many states have now reduced the first conviction
for use or possession of marijuana to a misdemeanor 2 and consciously
encourage probation and other rehabilitation-oriented sentences. The
Nixon administration after initially advocating increased penalties for
drug law violations later supported federal legislation,3 now enacted,
" Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1961, University of
Wisconsin; LL.B. 1964, Yale University. Member, District of Columbia Bar. The
author expresses his appreciation to Raymond Thoenig for his help in the research for
this Article.
1
See generally W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. rev. 1967);
A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW (1965); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY ComxisSION ON NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABusE, FINAL REPORT (1963) (Prettyman Commission); TASK FORCE ON NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABusE, PRESIDENT'S COMMSSIoN ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADmINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG AUSE (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
Treatment and rehabilitation of the drug abuser can, of course, mean different
things to different people. For example, many states advertise involuntary civil
commitment programs for narcotics addicts as an approach emphasizing rehabilitation
rather than punishment; yet some commentators dispute this claim. See A. LINDESMTH, supra, 290-94. Certainly a treatment and rehabilitation emphasis is attributed
to the new statutory schemes for placing the accused drug law violator under supervised probation, note 5 infra & accompanying text. Others contend that only "ambulatory" treatment of narcotics addicts, by which a physician prescribes maintenance
doses of the addicting drug while helping the addict cope with the social or medical
problem that led to addiction, can produce rehabilitation. See A. LINDESMITHa, supra,
passim; King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and
the Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736 (1953). Most persons would probably agree at least that
no single rehabilitative approach will work well for all kinds of drug abusers. See
Cole, Report on the Treatment of Drug Addiction, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, 135.
This Article will assume that "treatment and rehabilitation" approaches to drug abuse
include all approaches with the goal of cessation or restriction of drug abuse through
medical treatment or counseling of the drug abuser rather than through deterrence
effected by criminal sanctions.
2
See, e.g, Ws. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.30 (12) (a), 973.02 (Supp. 1971); id. §939.60

(1958).
3 S. 2637, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see 1969 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 57-A
(Presidential message to Congress).
In subsequent testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, announced that the Administration had changed its view and
was prepared to support legislation eliminating minimum sentences for nearly all first
offenses. Id. 710.
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which makes the first conviction for use or possession of any illegal drug
a misdemeanor and largely eliminates minimum sentences for all drug
offenses.' This legislation also permits probation and similar sentencing dispositions when the judge believes rehabilitation is a realistic
objective.' Complementing this change in statutory penalties, some law
enforcement agencies are now concentrating their efforts on detection
and arrest of large volume sellers rather than users and small-time
peddlers, usually also chronic drug users.'
Other policy changes reflecting increased emphasis on treatment
and rehabilitation of drug abusers tend to conflict with maintenance
of penal sanctions for illegal drug use. For example, government financial support is being given to medical and counseling programs aimed at
treating and rehabilitating the chronic drug abuser without exposing
him to criminal sanction.' In a number of cities law enforcement
officials have sanctioned medically supervised methadone maintenance
programs which aim to enable the narcotics abuser to cope better with
his environment without eliminating drug use itself.' Going even further, a few politicians are now discussing the legalization of marijuana,9
and lawyers are trying to obtain greater protection for users through
the courts.'0
While the limits of this trend are yet unclear, the conflicts are
certain to grow as new programs and laws proliferate. And unless the
two approaches are to undercut one another, perhaps dooming the
newer one, serious attention must be paid to rationalizing their differences and making appropriate adjustments. This Article will focus on
4 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.

91-513, tit. II, pt. D, §§ 401-11, 84 Stat. 1260 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841-51

(Supp. 1971)).

5 For the first possession offense, if the defendant pleads or is found guilty, the
judge may defer entry of judgment, with the defendant's consent, and place the defendant on probation of up to one year. On the defendant's satisfactory completion
of probation, the original charge is dropped. Id. § 404(b) (1), 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(b)
(1) (Supp. 1971); see id. §404(b)(2), 21 U.S.C.A. §844(b)(2) (Supp. 1971)
(expunging arrest record of minor discharged under the probation provision).
6 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE DISTRicT OF COLUMBIA, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS.,
DRUG ABUSE IN THE WASHINGTON AREA 16-28 (1969).
7Id. 28-33; see Community Mental Health Centers Act §§251-54, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2688k-n (Supp. V, 1970) ; Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 tits. III, IV,
42 U.S.C. §§3411-26, 3441 (Supp. V, 1970). The President recently reemphasized
that the government favors treatment programs for narcotics addicts, presumably
without threat of criminal prosecution. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1971, at 24, col. 1 (city
ed.).
8 Cole, supra note 1, at 135; Note, Methadone Maintenance for Heroin Addicts,
78 YALE L.J. 1175 (1969).
9

See, e.g., R. CLARK, CRIM IN AMmucA 85-100 (1970).
IOSee, e.g., Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 395
U.S. 6 (1969). See also Town, Privacy and the Marijuana Laws, in THE NEW
SocIAL DRUG 118 (D. Smith ed. 1970), & cases cited therein; Weiss & Wizner,
Pot, Prayer, Politics, and Privacy: The Right to Cut Your Own Throat in Your
Own Way, 54 IowA L. R.v. 709 (1969).
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one aspect of this emerging conflict: those laws which do or may
inhibit drug abusers from contacting physicans about their medical
and psychological problems. It will suggest particular changes which
should be implemented if the treatment and rehabilitation approach is to
be as successful as possible and will consider the extent to which
adoption of these changes would hinder implementation of other policies
with regard to drug abuse-in particular, policies reflecting a lawenforcement approach.
There are a number of reasons drug abusers need to consult
physicians for treatment and, hopefully, rehabilitation. A "bad trip"
can cause so much anxiety or (rarely) such destructive conduct that
the user requires sedation, which should be administered by physicians
because of the possibility of adverse side effects. Drug users who
"mainline"-that is, inject the drug directly into the vein-often suffer
from serious diseases, such as hepatitis, transmitted by unsterile hypodermic needles. Chronic users of methamphetamine ("speed") and
other drugs often suffer from malnutrition more readily recognized in
its incipient phases by physicians than laymen. A user dependent on
heroin or similar drugs often needs medical supervision if he goes
through the painful process of withdrawing from the drug. 1 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly to a policy of treatment and rehabilitation
for drug abuse, serious and habitual drug abuse usually indicates underlying personality disturbance or inadequate social adjustment, and no
rehabilitation program aiming at cessation of drug use can succeed
unless it helps the drug abuser cope with his disturbance or maladjustment.'
A doctor is frequently in a position to provide appropriate
counseling assistance in these circumstances or to refer a patient to a
"See generally Smith, Luce, & Dernburg, The Health of Haight-Ashbury,
7 TRANSACTION, Apr. 1970, at 35; Smith & Rose, Observations in the Haight-Ashbury
Medical Clinic of San Francisco, 7 CLINICAL PFDIATRiCS 313 (1968).
12 For narcotics addiction, the best evidence of this statement is the high rate of
readdiction among those who have undergone withdrawal with no accompanying counseling or aftercare. Withdrawal treatment which includes counseling and aftercare
usually achieves a substantially lower readdiction rate. L. KOLB, DRUG ADDICTION:
A MEDICAL PROBLEZM (1962) ; A. LiNDEswrrir, supra note 1, at 269-302; Cole, supra
note 1, at 138. Until recently, nearly all of the writing in this area concerned treatment of narcotics addiction only. Two articles discussing treatment and rehabilitation
of habitual users of hallucinogenic drugs have suggested that most such users have
no personality traits considered abnormal within their subculture; treatment aimed at
withdrawal from use of such drugs may require a willingness on the part of the user
to leave the subculture. Short of that, medical treatment is needed only for acute
reactions to drug use, typically resulting from use of impure drugs. Smith, Changing

Drug Patternsin the Haight-Ashbury, 110 CAL. MEDICINE 151, 155-56 (1969) ; Smith,
Use of LSD in the Haight-Ashbury, 110 CAL. MEDICINE 472 (1969). Finally, some
evidence, not yet accepted as conclusive, suggests that even chronic use of marijuana
has no harmful medical effecis and may not indicate any psychiatric disturbance or
social maladjustment. THE MARIHUANA PAI'ERs (D. Solomon ed. 1966); THE NEv
SOCIAL DRUG, supra note 10. If this is correct, from a medical point of view a
treatment approach could not have as a meaningful goal patient abstinence from

marijuana.
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person or institution that can provide it. And many persons find it
easier or more socially acceptable to approach a physician about drug
abuse problems, perhaps in conjunction with other medical treatment,
than a psychologist, professional counselor, or other person or institution
specializing in drug abuse problems. 3
Partly to meet these needs in communities where a large percentage of drug users reside, a few doctors have established clinics, the
most famous and successful of which is probably the Haight-Ashbury
Free Medical Clinic in San Francisco.14 One of the first problems these
clinics have faced has been a lack of rapport between their intended
clients and the medical profession. The organizers have discovered that
drug users shun established medical facilties, because they fear both
overt social disapproval by doctors and hospital personnel and the adverse use, in a criminal proceeding or in some other way, of the information they give doctors and hospital personnel about their drug
use.'5 Indeed, these fears are not groundless. Even today, some
doctors and hospitals report drug users to the police, apparently out of
either a feeling of social duty or a desire to discourage such individuals
from requesting their services. 16 To overcome these fears, clinics hos13 See MARYLAND COMM'N TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF DRUG ADDICTION, DRUG ABUSE

STUDY 343-49 (1969) (county schools, some staffed with professional counselors,
reported almost no incidence of drug abuse, while 38% of the same counties' physicians
reported about 100 cases of student drug abuse within a one year period).
Drug abusers should be encouraged to consult professional counselors as well as
physicians. It may therefore be desirable to protect the confidentiality of communications made by drug abusers to such persons. In general, the present law protects
such communications considerably less than communications to physicians. This
Article, however, focuses exclusively on physician-patient communications.
14See generally Smith, Luce, & Dernburg, supra note 11.
'5 [T]hese [establishment] physicians appear unwilling to attempt to solve the
local [drug subculture's] health problems. Like many policemen, the public
health representatives seem to look on young drug-abusers as subhuman.
When adolescents come to Park Emergency [in San Francisco] for help the
doctors frequently assault them with sermons, report them to the police or
submit them to complicated and drawn-out referral procedures that only
intensify their agony. The nurses sometimes tell prospective patients to take
their problems elsewhere. The ambulance drivers simply "forget" calls for
emergency assistance ....
Given this attitude, it is hardly surprising that the adolescents are as
frightened of public health officials as they are of policemen. Some would
sooner risk death than seek aid at Park Emergency . . . . Many merely live
with their symptoms, doctor themselves with home remedies or narcotize
themseives to relieve their pain. These young people do not trust "straight"
private physicians, who they assume will overcharge them and hand them
over to the law.
Id. 38; see MARYLAND COMM'N TO STUDY PROBLEMIS OF DRUG ADDICTION, supra note
13, at 133-39:
[Large numbers of] addicts tend to stay away from hospitals . . . . Moreover, when possible, they tend to hide the true nature of their complaint if
they are forced to use a hospital emergency room.
16Hearings on Inquiry into the Problem of Alcoholism and Narcotics Before the
Special Subcoinm. on Alcoholism & Narcotics of the Senate Comm. on Labor &
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 983 (1970); Madison Kaleidoscope,
Feb. 19, 1970, at 3, col. 3.
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pitable to drug users have necessarily taken extraordinary measures to
provide a friendly environment and insure confidentiality of communications.
The experiences of clinics like the Haight-Ashbury Free Medical
Clinic indicate that if such efforts to provide medical services to drug
users are to succeed, the client community needs assurance that the
information they give the doctors will not be used to the patients' disadvantage. This assurance cannot realistically be given, however, without a number of changes in federal and state law.
Because the penal laws pertaining to drug abuse are administered
in several kinds of proceedings at several levels of government and
overlap extensively, no single change can eliminate this risk. Those
laws suggesting the greatest potential for deterring resort to medical
help will be discussed here, but because a threat may be perceived
simultaneously from several quarters the incremental effect of any one
of the changes to be proposed may not immediately appear substantial.
Nevertheless, the elimination of legal deterrents to requests for treatment and rehabilitation is important, and, if each authority assumes the
responsibility for removing the deterrent caused by its laws, the benefits
to be gained from a fully implemented rationalization of the drug abuse
laws may be substantial.
I.

FEDERAL LAW

Three aspects of federal law should be changed or clarified if the
confidentiality of physician-patient communications concerning drug
abuse is to be fully protected. The first concerns the status of a
physician-patient testimonial privilege in federal court proceedings. A
significant but not altogether desirable proposal which would affect the
federal law governing the physician-patient privilege is the revised
draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts
and MagistratesYT The second concerns the investigatory powers
granted to the Attorney General by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.18 The third concerns the availability to federal officials of certain records which regulations issued by
1751 F.R.D. 315 (1971) [hereinafter cited as REVISED PROPOSED RULES]. Approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in October 1970 and then
submitted to the Supreme Court for approval and promulgation, 18 U.S.C. §3771
(Supp. V, 1970) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V, 1970), amending id. (1964), the proposed rules were returned by the Court to the Judicial Conference in March 1971
"for further consideration." The Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure has informally indicated that the reason for the Court's action was that
the revised draft of the rules, unlike the preliminary draft, had never been published,
depriving the legal community of the opportunity to submit comments and suggestions.
The Committee has invited comments on the revised draft.
18 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-966 (Supp. 1971).
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the Food and Drug Administration require of all methadone maintenance programs. 9
A. The Need for a Limited Federal Physician-PatientPrivilege
Under current federal law the rules of evidence applicable in the
United States District Courts vary with the state in which the court sits
and the nature of the case. In civil cases the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prescribe admission of evidence when either a federal statute
or rule of evidence or a state rule of evidence applicable in a state court
of general jurisdiction would admit it.20 Thus, if a doctor-patient
privilege is abrogated by any of these three, it need not now be recognized in federal civil cases. The importance of a doctor-patient privilege in drug abuse cases lies, however, mainly in the criminal area.
In such cases the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure seem to require
that admissibility be governed exclusively by federal law: either by a
federal statute or rule, or by "the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience."

2

A general physician-patient privilege did not

exist at common law, nor is it established by any federal statute or rule;
therefore under Rule 26 it is commonly assumed to be unavailable in
federal criminal cases.2 2 Two commentators have suggested that, whatever the legal theory, in federal criminal trials district judges often
apply the privilege rules of the state in which they are sitting.23 This
practice may often save a privilege in states where it exists, but uncertainty that any privilege will be preserved largely nullifies any incentive such a privilege may give anyone seeking medical help for
drug-related problems. Change is clearly appropriate if a treatment and
rehabilitation approach is to be tried.
The revised draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence would delete,
from both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ' and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 5 all reference to the evidentiary rules, substituting uniform Federal Rules of Evidence to be applied in all federal courts
1936
Fed. Reg. 6075 (1971) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.44).
20
FED. R. Cirv. P. 43(a).
21
FED. R. Cmr. P. 26.
2 E.g., C. DEWT, PIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND
PATIENT 9-10, 78-79 (1958).
23 Korn, Continuing Effect of State Rides of Evidence in the Federal Courts,

48 F.R.D. 65, 66 (1969) ; Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing
Draftsmen of Federal Rides of Evidence, 69 CoLuTm. L. REv. 353, 371-72 (1969).
24See 51 F.R.D. 315, 470 (1971) (Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 43).
25 See id. at 472 (Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 26).
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in criminal, civil, and other cases.

6

Article V of the proposed rules,

covering privileges, contains no general doctor-patient testimonial privilege, recognizing instead only a psychotherapist-patient privilege.17 In
criminal prosecutions for federal drug abuse offenses, enactment of these
provisions will often enable the prosecution to subpoena a physician and
compel him to testify about incriminating confidential communications
received from a defendant-patient s Thus, if the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence are adopted without change, a user of illegal drugs
who consults a physician about medical problems will be taking some
risk that the information he communicates to the physician will subsequently be introduced in support of a prosecution for violation of the
federal drug laws, even if the confidentiality of the communications
would be fully protected in any state prosecution.
There is no published evidence that the advisory committee which
drafted the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence ever considered the
impact of its rules concerning testimonial privileges on the medical
treatment of drug abusers. The Committee was essentially directed to
draft rules that would be uniform, and they apparently accepted this
direction without questioning the desirability of uniform rules in crim9
inal cases.
The Advisory Committee concluded that the physician-patient privilege should not be one of the uniform rules. The Committee's notes
offer only brief justification for this position. The single substantive

argument advanced by the Committee is that
the exceptions [to a general privilege] which have been found
necessary [by many states] in order to obtain information
required by the public interest or to avoid fraud 30
are so
numerous as to leave little if any basis for the privilege.
This comment reflects the fact that some states have never adopted the
privilege and others have created exceptions to a general privilege statute for various proceedings. 3 California, for example, excepts all
26

See
27Id.,
28
See
recognized

RmsED PROPOSED RuLES, supra note 17, rule 1101, 51 F.R.D. at 462.
rules 501, 504, 51 F.R.D. 351, at 366.
note 4 supra. The physician's testimony would be admissible under a wellexception to the hearsay rule. See C. McCoRMIcK, EVMENCE § 266, at
563-64 (1954); REvIsED PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 17, rule 803(4), 51 F.R.D. at

419.

29 See 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962)

(Preliminary Committee Report) ; Cleary, The Plai

for the Adoption of Riles of Evidence for United States District Courts, 25 REcoRD

OF N.Y.C.B.A. 142, 144 (1970).
DOREVISED PROPOSED RULEs, supra note 17, 51 F.R.D. at 367 (Advisory Com-

mittee's Note to rule 504). Other arguments were premised on the absence of a
privilege in federal criminal cases, and thus assume the point in issue here.
31 For a survey of state physician-patient privilege statutes, see C. DEW=T, supra
note 22, at 447-71.
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criminal proceedings from the operation of the privilege. 2 In states
without a privilege or with very broad exceptions to it a federal privilege broader than that of the state would do little to encourage drug
users to seek medical help, since the drug laws overlap and few users
could safely assume that a case against them would not be brought in
state courts. Other states do maintain a viable doctor-patient privilege,
however, and the Advisory Committee's notes ignore the possibility of
impeding the effectiveness of such state rules by adopting a contrary
federal rule.
From the absence of any lengthy justification in the Advisory
Committee's notes one may suspect that the drafters of the proposed
Federal Rules were heavily influenced by various evidence scholars who
have long called for the abolition of the physician-patient privilege. 3
These scholars have doubted the empirical validity of the essential
justification for a privilege: that it is needed to encourage a patient to
disclose all aspects of his ailments so that his doctor can better treat
him. They have asserted that most patients willingly divulge information about their medical condition to their doctors, even without the
guarantee of a testimonial privilege, because typically patients do not
weigh the potential consequences of future litigation in deciding whether
to consult physicians. 4 These scholars further point to the many
instances in which the privilege has been invoked to prevent disclosure
of reliable but adverse communications not made with the understanding
that they would be kept confidential. Such instances frequently occur in
health and disability insurance and personal injury cases wherein the
plaintiff seeks to prevent introduction of medical reports contrary to
his interests.3 5 Because of such abuses, McCormick has concluded that
"the privilege in the main operates not as the shield of privacy but as
the protector of fraud." 6
But even though one may not question that in the usual situation
patients do not think about potential litigation consequences when
deciding whether to consult a doctor, and that consequently the lack
of a testimonial privilege should have no effect on their willingness to
32 CAL.

Evm.

CODE

§998 (West 1966).

33 See C. McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 108, at 221-24 (1954) ; 8 J. WIGMoRE,

Ev-MENCE

§2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961); Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice
Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE
L.J. 607 (1943) ; Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony
by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REv. 285, 290-91 (1943).
34 See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 33, at 291.
3 See Weinstock, Physician-PatientPrivilege: Problems in Life and Health Insurance Litigation, 5 FoRum 37 (1969); sources cited note 33 spra.
36 C. McCoRMicx, EvIDENCE § 108, at 224 (1954).
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do so,ur this assumption cannot properly be made for drug abusers. The
experiences of physicians who have made concentrated efforts to treat
drug abusers indicate that many are deterred from seeking medical
assistance by fear of legal consequences.8" The growth of many lay
organizations, such as "acid rescue leagues," to treat drug-related
medical problems probably reflects similar fears. Because in most of
these situations the fear of legal consequences may have resulted from
the practice of many physicians and hospitals of reporting drug users
to the police, it is not certain that the absence of a testimonial privilege
(which is applicable only in court) would by itself deter requests for
medical assistance. Certainly, however, the contrary assertion cannot
be supported. Moreover, the evidence documenting the suspicious
attitudes of many drug users towards establishment individuals and
institutions 89 strongly suggests that at least some drug abusers fear
that their communications would be used against them in court. This
inference has been reinforced, for me, by my experiences at the University of Wisconsin in discussing the legal implications of drug use
with students and in helping a group of medical students establish a
hybrid clinic and referral service patronized in part by drug abusers.
These experiences revealed a strong interest by drug users in the legal
implications of their conduct.
True, factors peculiar to federal prosecutions militate against the
argument that an absence of a federal physician-patient privilege for
drug abusers will deter requests for needed medical assistance. Even
though the present law of evidence applicable to federal criminal trials
may already fail to recognize a testimonial privilege for physician-patient
communications,40 there has not so far been large scale manifestation of
concern about this fact, either at the University of Wisconsin or, to my
knowledge, elsewhere. One may assert that this is because the threat
of federal prosecution is small since federal enforcement officials today
37 See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 33, at 291:

Nor is there any objective evidence that the existence of the privilege has

had any influence in promoting public health or that its absence has had an
adverse influence. . . . No one has had the temerity to assert that progress
in medical science in England, in Maryland, in Massachusetts has been deterred in the slightest degree by their adherence to the common law rule, or
that the development of the science and art of healing has been advanced in
any measure in any state by the presence of the privilege. In short, there is
nothing to demonstrate any benefit to the public in the privilege, while the
law books are full of instances where its application has prevented the discovery of the truth to the damage of honest litigants.
38
See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
39 Id.
40
See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) ; Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc.,
275 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1960) ; FED. P. Cmam. P. 26; Orfield, The Reform of Federal
Criminal Evidence, 32 F.R.D. 121 (1963); Weinstein, supra note 23, at 377-95
(Appendix by Paul Sherman).
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are almost solely interested in convicting large volume distributors of
illegal drugs, leaving it to the states to enforce laws against users.4 1 It
is even more unlikely that federal officials would prosecute a drug user
on the basis of communications he made to a physician, because the
charge at both the state and federal level against most drug users is
possession, not use, of illegal drugs, and because the prosecution's principal evidence usually is that the defendant possessed the drugs at the
time of his arrest. It might be contended, therefore, that the absence
of a federal privilege does not and should not discourage users of illegal
drugs from consulting physicians.
Difficulties, however, do arise with denying a federal privilege.
In the first place, the existing law is far from clear about the status of a
testimonial privilege in federal courts; the ambiguity may vitiate any
deterrence to seeking medical aid which a clear denial of the privilege
would effect. Codified in an explicit way, the law will probably become
known and more strongly deter medical requests by drug abusers, who
are becoming increasingly sophisticated about their legal rights. Secondly, the contention fails to recognize that many drug users, particularly
residents of drug subcultures in which the medical problems are probably
most severe, are highly suspicious of the motives of police, federal prosecutors, and most doctors and hospitals. Because federal prosecution of
users is technically possible, and users are becoming increasingly sophisticated in the law, a substantial number of such persons are likely simply
to disbelieve assurances that despite the law there is no risk of federal
prosecution based on communications made to physicians. The argument here is not, of course, that all drug users, or perhaps even any, will
perceive the risk of prosecution as so great that they will never seek
medical assistance for medical problems, no matter how serious. But
a significant risk arises that, even if other deterring laws are unchanged,
a federal rule of no-privilege will deter some drug users from requesting
medical assistance in situations when such assistance is advisable.
The question of including a physician-patient privilege in the federal rules basically turns on weighing the desirability of encouraging
drug users to consult physicians against the desirability of having all
relevant evidence presented in federal prosecutions for violation of the
drug laws. The latter goal is often cited in justifications of the existing
federal law that apparently fails to recognize state privileges in federal
criminal prosecutions.'
Today this goal ought not be given great
41 See CRn
CONTROL DIGEST, Oct. 23, 1970, at 4-7. Federal law, though, prohibits possession and use of dangerous drugs as well as more serious offenses such as
selling. See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C.A.
§§841-51 (Supp. 1971).
42
See, e.g., REvIsED PROPOSED RULES, supra note 17, 51 F.R.D. at 367 (Advisory
Committee's Note to rule 504).
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weight in considering a rule regarding the confidentiality of physicianpatient communications about drug abuse. First, as already noted,
federal enforcement officials are interested chiefly in prosecuting largevolume sellers of illicit drugs, even though mere possession and use remain violations of federal law. It is highly unlikely that relevant information could be obtained in such prosecutions from physicians, partly
because most large-volume sellers are not users and therefore have no
drug-related reason to consult a doctor, and partly because even a userdistributor who saw a doctor about his own abuse problem would have
no reason to communicate confidential information about illicit sales
operations. Consequently, a federal privilege is unlikely to hinder those
prosecutions of drug law violators that federal enforcement officials are
likely to initiate. Secondly, in the rare case in which there is a federal
prosecution of a mere user, the change in overall federal drug policy
from an exclusively punitive approach to one also emphasizing treatment and rehabilitation justifies impeding potential prosecutions of drug
users. Admittedly, a treatment-and-rehabilitation approach to drug
abuse problems remains largely untested in this country, but our long
and unhappy experience with an exclusively punitive approach 4 3 surely
should support a policy of giving new approaches towards mere users
every possible chance to succeed. Finally, it is highly unlikely that a
physician-patient privilege will impede seriously the successful prosecution of illegal drug users. Even today such prosecutions almost never
rest on communications made to physicians."'
A final consideration in weighing the desirability of a federal
privilege for drug abusers is the potential impact on investigations by
enforcement officials of drug law violations. Although federal officials
rarely prosecute drug users, they sometimes use information provided
by users to trace dealers. Pursuant to such an investigative approach
federal officials might ask some physicians to reveal the names of drug
users they have treated so that the users could be interrogated about
their source of supply. Although the testimonial privilege would not
technically prevent voluntary cooperation by physicians and hospitalssince the privilege applies only to in-court testimony-its existence
would probably make voluntary reporting less likely. The effectiveness
of the privilege aside, the investigative needs of the federal officials do
not justify its negation. My conversations with one federal enforcement
official and with numerous physicians have failed to reveal a single
instance in which federal officials have adopted this investigative
strategy. Moreover, it is unlikely that an investigative strategy will
supra note

43

See W. ELURnGE,

44

Text following note 41 supra.
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ever be used regularly by federal enforcement officials: it would soon
deter all drug users from contacting physicians except in circumstances
of very serious illness, 45 and once a deterrent effect took hold, enforcement officials would uncover few leads. Simultaneously, any hope for
successful implementation of a treatment-and-rehabilitation approach to
drug abuse would cease. Since enforcement officials might adopt this
investigative strategy, a proposal for a federal physician-patient privilege
at least poses a potential conflict between two important goals of existing
federal policy towards drug abuse: prosecution of dealers in illicit drugs
and rehabilitation of users of illegal drugs. My own biases lead me to
favor the rehabilitation goal in the event of conflict. But even if the
other goal is favored, the utility of an investigative approach that asks
physicians to identify patients using drugs is so problematic that a
privilege should be established at least until it can be shown to hinder
significantly the detection and prosecution of large volume dealers.
I conclude, therefore, that a proper balancing of the needs of our
varying approaches to the drug abuse problem supports the establishment of some form of physician-patient privilege applicable in the
federal courts. Although a rule of no-privilege might deter a large
number of requests for medical assistance, the interests that would be
impeded by a privilege are insubstantial. The question then becomes
how specifically to frame the privilege. One might contend that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the proposed Federal Rules 46 is
broad enough to cover drug abuse cases. The definition of psychotherapist includes "a person authorized to practice medicine . . . who
devotes all or a part of his time to the practice of psychiatry, or is reasonably believed by the patient so to be." " A patient is defined as "a
person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his inental or emotional condition." 48 This limited privilege would permit a group of psychiatrists
to establish a clinic catering to the mental and emotional problems of
45 See note 15 supra.
supra note 17, 51 F.R.D. at 315.
47Id., rule 504(a) (2) (i), 51 F.R.D. at 366. Rule 504(a) (2) (ii) also includes
licensed clinical psychologists as psychotherapists for purposes of this rule.
The preliminary draft of the proposed rules limited the definition of psychotherapist to a doctor who devotes "a substantial portion" of his time to the practice of
psychiatry. PRoPosED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNrrED STATES DIsTIcT COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES rule 5-04(a) (2) (Preliminary Draft, 1969), in 46 F.R.D. 161, 257
(1969). The revised draft affords the protection of the privilege to a much larger
proportion of drug counseling by physicians.
48 REVISED PROPOSED RULEs, rule 504(a) (1), supra note 17, 51 F.R.D. at 366
(emphasis added). This Article discusses only the need for a physician-patient privilege for communications concerning drug abuse. There are other medical problems,
such as venereal disease, which people will be reluctant to discuss with a physician
unless confidentiality is assured. A federal testimonial privilege for communications
concerning these problems might also be granted.
46 RFEvisD PROPOSED RULES,
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drug users and guarantee their clients confidentiality. Moreover, since
the treatment of drug abusers frequently involves counseling in connection with their underlying psychological problems, an argument might
be made that any doctor who treats drug abusers "devotes . . . a part

of his time to the practice of psychiatry" and that his patients are
"examined or interviewed" (at least in part) "for purposes of diagnosis
or treatment of [their] mental or emotional condition." These possibilities alone, however, will not avoid the deleterious effects of the
proposed Federal Rules on the willingness of drug abusers to seek medical assistance. In the first place, where the drug abusers seeks assistance
for a purely medical problem, such as poisoning from impure drugs or
inflammation of the veins, it is difficult to stretch the definition of patient
to provide a privilege. More importantly, to be encouraged successfully
to make use of physicians, a drug user highly suspicious of doctors and
law enforcement officials needs a guarantee that his communications will
remain confidential, not merely an arguable legal defense to their use in
a subsequent criminal prosecution.
It appears, consequently, that the proposed Federal Rules need
amendment. The arguments I have made do not support a general privilege because for many types of physician-patient communications the
dangers that the privilege will be invoked for fraudulent purposes may
outweigh any dangers of deterrence to the disclosure of ailments to a
physician. A privilege should be granted, however, for those types of
communications, such as ones concerning drug abuse, for which the case
for a privilege is strongest. Many states have provided a privilege with
exceptions for communications concerning acts with regard to which the
public interest in having evidence revealed in court is considered particularly strong-for instance, communications which reveal child
abuse.49 What I am suggesting here is that this approach be stood on
its head. The federal rules of evidence might omit a general physicianpatient privilege but grant it in certain limited circumstances.
Iowa has recently enacted a statute which apparently takes this
approach. That act protects communications to medical practitioners
made by any person requesting "treatment and rehabilitation for [drug]
addiction or dependency." 50 The statute, however, does not define "addiction," "dependency," "treatment," or "rehabilitation," and consequently it is unclear whether only some drug abusers seeking medical
assistance are protected by the privilege. 1 The failure to define "treat49

See C. DEWiTr, supra note 22, at 447-71.
o IovA CoDE Amr. §§ 224A.2-3 (Supp. 1971).
In medical circles the term "addiction' is disfavored, and all habitual use of
drugs is defined as "dependence," which can be physical, psychological, or both. See
Eddy et al., Drug Dependence: Its Significance and Characteristics, 32 BuLL. OF
51

WHO 721 (1965) ; Seevers, PsychopharmacologicalElements of Drug Dependence,
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ment" and "rehabilitation" leaves open the possibility that the privilege
does not protect all drug dependent persons requesting medical treatment, but rather only those persons requesting assistance in ceasing a
drug dependency. The use of the phrase "treatment and rehabilitation"
in some sections of the statute cannot be relied upon as an interpretative
tool, since in the same sections the phrase "treatment or rehabilitation"
also appears, without any evident reason for changing conjunctions.
Restricting the privilege to those seeking to eliminate a dependency, as
is thus at least feasible, would have the advantage of limiting the privilege to circumstances in which the case for a treatment approach to drug
abuse problems, and for overriding any law-enforcement interest in
omitting the privilege, is strongest. On the other hand, it continues to
deter requests for medical assistance in circumstances in which a user
needs medical assistance (for example, in dealing with the effects of a
bad trip) but does not desire to cease using drugs.
As previously indicated, the different focus of federal law makes
it unlikely that a broader federal privilege will significantly hinder federal law enforcement. And, I trust, few persons regard illegal drug
use as such a serious crime that we should attempt to deter it by making
one of its costs the unavailability of medical assistance for serious,
drug-related medical problems. Consequently, at least pending a
stronger case that a privilege will hinder law enforcement, the privilege
should be extended to all requests for medical assistance in connection
with use of illegal drugs. The Iowa statute is not a good model for a
federal rule.
The approach just suggested might be criticized on the ground that
protecting the confidentiality of communications regarding drug abuse
serves little purpose if the communications are made in those states
52
which will not respect their confidentiality in criminal proceedings.
An answer to this objection is that granting a uniform privilege in
federal courts for such communications probably will little hinder federal investigations and prosecutions. If this objection is nevertheless
considered weighty, 3 then the proposed Federal Rules might be
206 J.A.M.A. 1263 (1968). The concept of dependence is not, however, so precise
as to make easy the classification of drug users as either "dependent" or "not dependent." This imprecision of the Iowa statute may deter drug abusers from seeking
medical assistance, thus vitiating the statute's intended effect.
52 See C. DEWrrr, supra note 22, at 447-71.
53 The possibility of forum shopping in civil suits is the major objection to a
federal rule different from the state rule. But the decision to adopt uniform federal
rules of evidence indicates that the forum-shopping objection has not been weighted
heavily. If a federal privilege were limited largely to criminal proceedings, forum
shopping in the usual sense cannot be involved. A discrepancy between the state and
the federal rule of privilege might however, influence the decision whether to
prosecute under state or federal law.
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amended to provide that a state physician-patient privilege shall govern
with regard to communications concerning drug abuse, but only when
the state privilege is broader than the privilege otherwise recognized
by the federal rules.
Admittedly such an approach would be inconsistent with the goal
of uniformity for federal rules of evidence. Before the Chief Justice of
the United States appointed the present drafting committee, he first
appointed, in 1960, a Special Committee on Evidence to consider the
advisability and feasibility of developing uniform rules of evidence for
the federal courts. That Committee reported that uniform rules were
both desirable and feasible, and on its recommendation the present
Advisory Committee was appointed to prepare such rules. The principal justification for uniform rules given by the Special Committee
rested on the complexity of the existing rules of evidence. It noted that
although the federal courts were authorized to create their own rules of
evidence in criminal, admiralty, and bankruptcy cases, no systematic and
understandable body of case law had been developed. The situation in
many states was as bad or worse. The result, the Committee noted,
was that inconsistent decisions were often reached in cases purportedly
governed by the same law. It concluded that if the Supreme Court were
to promulgate uniform rules of evidence for federal courts, evidence
decisions in federal courts would be made more easily and more rationally, and the states might be encouraged to simplify and rationalize their
own evidence laws. 4
Although recognition of a state physician-patient privilege broader
than the privilege provided by the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
would impinge somewhat on a policy of uniformity, I do not believe
that it would seriously undercut the principal justifications that have
been offered for a policy of uniformity. So long as the number of provisions in the Federal Rules dependent on state law is limited, the rules
will not become unduly complex. 5 Nor do I believe that such a provision would impinge on the goal of providing the states with an
example of sensible evidentiary rules that they can copy. At a minimum,
it would seem, sufficient doubt has been cast on the wisdom of denying
a physician-patient privilege for communications regarding drug abuse
to undercut any argument that the federal government should encourage
the states to deny the privilege.
54 Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform
Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962) ; see Estes, The Need
for Uniform Rides of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 331 (1960).
i55 Proposed rule 502, 51 F.R.D. at 360, already provides for limited variation
betveen states, in recognizing the privileged character of reports required by law,

when the requiring law also provides for their confidentiality.
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My conviction on this point is strengthened by considerations of
federalism, which are largely ignored in the proposed rules with their
single-minded concern for uniformity. Indeed, concern with federalism
has led several renowned evidence scholars to question whether in
diversity cases the Federal Rules should, or can constitutionally, ignore
testimonial privileges established by the state in which the case is
heard, or, depending on the applicable conflict-of-law rules, in which
the communication was made.56 These scholars have suggested that a
state's interest in fostering certain interpersonal relationships by providing for testimonial privileges should be respected in the absence of
any overriding federal interest. In federal criminal cases, however,
federalism has usually not been advanced as a reason to question
seriously a policy of uniformity in evidentiary rules. 7 Following two
Supreme Court decisions rendered in the early 1930's holding that
evidentiary questions in federal criminal cases were to be determined
according to federal law," it has been assumed that the federal interest
in ascertaining the truth in prosecutions for transgression of its laws
outweighs any state interest in avoiding federal infringement of its
policy of fostering certain interpersonal relationships by creating testimonial privileges. Given the seriousness of the growing drug abuse
problem, however, a state's decision, as part of an overall treatment-andrehabilitation approach, to encourage drug abusers to contact physicians
by providing protection for confidential communications is worthy of
respect. And the federal interest in prosecutions for violations of its
drug abuse laws is smallest in those cases in which the privilege is most
likely to become a relevant issue-prosecutions for possession or use
of illicit drugs.59
56 C. WRIGnT, FEDERAL COURTS 409-15 (2d ed. 1970); Degnan, The Law of
Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HAgv. L. REv. 275, 287-301 (1962) ; Weinstein, supra
note 23, at 370-73. See also Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confuision:
Privileges in Federal Courts Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101 (1956).
_7 But see Weinstein, supra note 23, at 370-72.
58
Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) ; Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.

371 (1933).

-9 One final objection to a privilege for physician-patient communications regarding drug abuse is that as proposed here it would be applicable not only in criminal
trials, but in civil proceedings, such as personal injury suits or actions on insurance
policies, as well. Misuse of the privilege in such civil proceedings has caused much
of the current agitation to abolish the privilege. See notes 33-36 supra & accompanying text. If it is thought necessary to limit a privilege for communications concerning
drug abuse so that it is inapplicable to personal injury suits, actions on insurance
policies, and perhaps a few other civil actions, such a limitation would be unlikely to
deter significantly the willingness of drug users to request medical assistance. Care
should be taken in delimiting the civil proceedings to be included in the exception,

however, because of the existence of involuntary civil commitment proceedings for
narcotics addicts in federal courts. See Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966,
42 U.S.C. §§3411-26 (Supp. V, 1970); Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotic
Addicts, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 405 (1967). Narcotics addicts contemplating requesting
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Finally, it should be noted that there is still time to incorporate the
suggestions made in this Article in the Federal Rules of Evidence before
they are officially adopted. The revised draft of the proposed rules,
which is the version that has been discussed in this Article, was approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in October
1970 and then submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration and
promulgation. In March 1971 the Supreme Court returned the revised
draft to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference for further consideration," and that Committee
has indicated that it will entertain comments and suggestions from the
profession until August 1, 1971. Presumably sometime thereafter the
Judicial Conference will resubmit the rules to the Supreme Court,
perhaps with some revisions of the present draft. If the Court approves
and promulgates the rules, they will become effective ninety days thereafter, unless in the interim Congress alters their provisions or remands
them to the Court for further consideration. 6
B. Limiting Investigatory Power Under the Controlled
Substances Act
The second aspect of federal law potentially jeopardizing the confidentiality of physician-patient communications is the scope of the
investigatory powers granted the Attorney General in the recently
enacted omnibus revision of the federal drug control laws. 2 Two
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act could be interpreted to
give the Attorney General the power to demand access to records
containing information communicated confidentially by a drug user to
a physician or to hospital personnel. The first would authorize the
Attorney General, in the course of investigations
relating to his functions under this title with respect to controlled substances . . . [to] subpena witnesses, compel the

attendance and testimony of witnesses, and require the production of any records . . . which the Attorney
General finds
63
relevant or material to the investigation.
medical assistance would probably fear involuntary commitment nearly as much as
criminal confinement. On the other hand, the government may have a stronger
interest in having physician-patient communications available for involuntary commitment proceedings than for criminal prosecutions or law enforcement investigations.

90 See Letter from Albert B. Mars to the Bench & Bar, March 15, 1971, in
51 F.R.D. 316.
6118 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. V, 1970) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V, 1970). A copy
of this Article was submitted to the Committee during preparation for publication.
62 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. §§801-966 (Supp. 1971)). Title II of
this Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-904 (Supp. 1971), is called the Controlled Substances Act.

63 Controlled Substances Act § 506(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 876(a) (Supp. 1971).
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This provision makes no mention of any testimonial privileges that
would be recognized in such investigations, although obviously the
self-incrimination privilege would be recognized. Perhaps, by interpretation, the doctor-patient privilege would be recognized as well, although this result seems highly unlikely if the Federal Rules of Evidence
fail to provide for a privilege in federal criminal cases.
The second provision potentially providing the Attorney General
access to confidential information allows the issuance of administrative inspection warrants which would authorize inspections by the
Attorney General of "controlled premises," defined by the Act in such a
manner as to include many doctors' offices and nearly all hospitals. 4
Such a warrant issues whenever the judge or magistrate finds there is
"a valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this title or
regulations thereunder sufficient to justify administrative inspections
of the area. . . . " " Unless the warrant indicates otherwise, the
Attorney General may then inspect "all . . . things . . . (including

records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities) appropriate for
verification of the records, reports, and documents [required by the
,,66
Act] . . . or otherwise bearing on the provisions of this title . .
Certain matters, including financial and pricing data, are specifically
exempted from this general power to inspect,6 7 and omission of confidential information regarding patients from this list suggests an
exemption for such information could not be carved out by interpretation.
64Id. §510(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §880(a) (Supp. 1971). A third power given the
Attorney General authorizes him to "inspect the establishment of a registrant or
applicant for registration in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated
by him." Controlled Substances Act §302(f), 21 U.S.C.A. §822(f) (Supp. 1971).
Since essentially all doctors and liospitals are required to register under the Act, on
its face this section gives the Attorney General the broadest possible investigatory
power. It is doubtful, however, that the provision should be so interpreted, for to do
so would render meaningless the procedures painstakingly delineated in the section
authorizing administrative inspections and warrants. See note 66 infra. More likely
§302(f) will be used only for inspections at the time of initial registration; nevertheless, at this time as at any other, there is a need to protect the confidentiality of
physician-patient communications at that time.
65
Id. §510(d) (1), 21 U.S.C.A. §880(d) (1) (Supp. 1971).
66
Id. §510(b) (3) (B), 21 U.S.C.A. §880(b) (3) (B) (Supp. 1971). Section 510
(d) (2), 21 U.S.C.A. § 880(d) (2) (Supp. 1971), provides that a warrant must identify
"the area, premises, building, or conveyance to be inspected, the purpose of such
inspection, and, where appropriate, the type of property to be inspected, if any." The
issuing magistrate can therefore restrict the inspection to deny access to confidential
physician-patient communications. Typically, however, issuers of search warrants
merely approve the -wording proposed by the applicant. Applicants for administrative
inspection warrants will probably seek the widest possible inspections of controlled
premises.
67Id. § 510(b) (4), 21 U.S.C.A. § 880(b) (4) (Supp. 1971). The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, however, in response to a request from the American
Medical Association, has indicated that it is considering exempting medical diagnosis
and therapy records from administrative inspections. 36 Fed. Reg. 7777 (1971)
(Comments and Objections to Part 316, No. 1).
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The investigatory powers granted the Attorney General by these
two provisions in the omnibus revision of the federal drug control laws
contain many of the same infirmities as the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence. Even assuming these investigatory powers will be interpreted to entitle the Attorney General to compel testimony about, or to
gain access to records reflecting, confidential physician-patient communications, the Act would not by itself permit the introduction into
court of this information. Nevertheless, there is a serious risk that
the possible availability of such information to the Attorney General
will convince many prospective patients, if they become aware of the
Attorney General's powers, that by communicating incriminating information to the physician, they could become the focus of a subsequent
investigation. During this investigation admissible incriminating information might be uncovered. Alternatively, the investigation might
uncover the patient's illegal drug source, and that source is frequently
a friend.
It is somewhat ironic that the Act provides the Attorney General
with investigatory powers that could have this deterrent effect, for
there is no indication of a legislative intent to permit the Attorney
General to jeopardize the confidentiality of communications between
doctor and patient. The structure of the Act implies that the primary
purpose in authorizing the Attorney General to hold administrative
hearings for which he can subpoena witnesses and records was to give
him a means to acquire the information he needs to place controlled
substances in different classifications established by the Act 6s and to
set quotas on the legitimate production of certain classifications of controlled substances.69 There is no suggestion in the legislative history
that the Attorney General was to use administrative hearings to gain
information on which to base prosecutions for illegal use or sale of
controlled drugs, yet section 505 (a) clearly authorizes the subpoena
of patient files for administrative hearings. And access to confidential
physician-patient communications would most clearly aid the Attorney
General in hearings with this latter objective.
Similarly, the scheme of the Act indicates that the primary purpose
of authorizing the Attorney General to conduct administrative inspec6 See Controlled Substances Act §§ 201-02, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 811-12 (Supp. 1971).

69 See id. § 306, 21 U.S.C.A. §826 (Supp. 1971).

In the original bill, title V

was called Offenses and Penalties, title VI (containing the hearing section) was called

Administrative Provisions, and title VII was called Enforcement Provisions, implying
a separation of the hearing power from the enforcement powers.

See S. 2637, 91st

Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). In the bill's final form, title IV was moved back to become
subchapter II, and titles VI and VII were combined as part E, with no changes in
the order or content of the individual sections. See H.P. 18,583, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
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tions was to provide him with a means to verify the reports and records
that the Act requires of persons authorized to manufacture, distribute,
In the overwhelming
or dispense certain controlled substances."
majority of circumstances the Attorney General could adequately verify
the required reports and records without access to confidential physicianpatient records. 1 But the language of the Act permits administrative
inspections of all things located on controlled premises "appropriate for
verification" of records required by the Act "or otherwise bearing on
,, And other provisions of the title
the provisions of this title . .
establish criminal penalties for the illegal possession or sale of controlled substances.7 s
Further indication that Congress did not intend the Attorney
General to jeopardize the confidentiality of physician-patient communications is provided by two discretionary provisions in the Act which
specifically protect communication in limited circumstances. One provision imposes a duty on all federal agencies and instrumentalities, when
so requested, to assist the Attorney General in enforcing the Act. 4
Contained in the Administration's original version of the Act,7 5 this
provision was lengthened by Congress to provide also that no such
agency "shall be required to furnish the name of, or other identifying
information about, a patient or research subject whose identity it has
"2

70 See Controlled Substances Act §§ 302-03, 307, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 822-23, 827 (Supp.
1971). The Act authorizes administrative inspections only of "controlled premises,"
which will include the offices of some, but not all, doctors who treat drug abusers.
See id. § 510, 21 U.S.C.A. § 880 (Supp. 1971). Had Congress intended the administrative inspections to give the Attorney General access to all files on drug abuse
patients, it could have so provided; but as the Act stands, the presence of patient
records on controlled premises is only a coincidence of which Congress indicated no
intention to take advantage.
71 Many doctors are exempted from recordkeeping requirements (although their
premises are still defined as "controlled premises" for purposes of the administrative
inspection warrant provision). Controlled Substances Act §307(c), 21 U.S.C.A.
§827(c) (Supp. 1971). Where doctors and hospitals are required to keep records,
basically they must show only how a controlled substance was distributed or dispersed.
Id. §307(a), 21 U.S.C.A. §827(a) (Supp. 1971). The Act specifically permits a
registrant to maintain the records required by the Act separate from his other records.
Id. § 307(b) (2) (A), 21 U.S.C.A. § 827(b) (2) (A).
72 Id. § 510(b) (3) (B), 21 U.S.C.A. § 880(b) (3) (B) (Supp. 1971).
73 See id. part D, 21 U.S.C.A. §§841-51 (Supp. 1971). There may, of course,
be constitutional objections to permitting an administrative inspection to be used to
collect evidence on which a criminal prosecution can be based. The standard of
probable cause provided in the Act for issuance of an administrative inspection warrant
is less stringent than that required for a search warrant. A less stringent standard
may be constitutional so long as the purpose of the administrative inspection is limited
to verification of required reports and records. See Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967) ; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). If an administrative inspection has a different purpose, however, traditional standards of probable
cause may be required.
74 Controlled Substances Act § 503(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 873(b) (Supp. 1971).
75 H.R. 13,742, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 603(b) (1969); S. 2637, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 603(b) (1969).
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undertaken to keep confidential." 'I This section could be interpreted to
foreclose access by the Attorney General, under his investigatory
powers, to records held by a federal agency of confidential doctor-patient
communications it did not wish to divulge. 7 The other provision originally appeared in the Administration's bill " and was approved by Congress without substantial change. It permits the Attorney General to
"authorize persons engaged in research to withhold the names and other
identifying characteristics of .

.

subjects of such research," and

persons so authorized cannot be compelled to reveal such information
in any state or federal proceeding, including the Attorney General's
investigatory proceedings. 9 A final indication of congressional intent
is contained in an extensive amendment to the bill passed by the Senate
which would have established a vastly expanded rehabilitation program
for drug abusers."0 One part of this amendment would have stringently
protected physician-patient communications relating to drug abuse in
both state and federal proceedings."- The entire rehabilitation amendment, including the confidentiality provision, was deleted by the conference committee. The conference report made no mention of the
confidentiality issue, justifying the deletion on the ground that the
House had not had an opportunity to hold hearings on the extensive,
government-financed rehabilitation program. 2
16 Controlled Substances Act § 503(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 873(b)
(Supp. 1971). The
amendment was approved by voice vote. 116 CONG. REc. 1335, 1336 (1970).
77 The Act furnishes no definition of federal "agency or instrumentality," leaving
open the possibility that a hospital receiving federal financial assistance could be
considered a federal agency or instrumentality for purposes of this section.
7S S. 2637, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 602(c) (1969).
2
70 Controlled Substances Act § 50 (c), 21 U.S.C.A. § 872(c) (Supp. 1971).
SO S. AmDT. No. 1003 to H.R. 18,583, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
811d. § 132(b) :

(b) All patient records and all information contained therein relating to
drug abuse or drug dependence prepared or obtained by a private practitioner
shall remain confidential, and may be disclosed only with the patient's consent
and only to medical personnel for purposes of diagnosis and treatment of the
patient or to Government or other officials for the purpose of obtaining benefits
due the patient as a result of his drug dependence.
82 CONF. RE'. No. 1603, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Naws 4657, 4658. For the legislative history of the entire Act, including this
amendment, see CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Oct. 16, 1970, at 2539-42.
The efforts of the National Committee for Effective Drug Abuse Legislation, a
lobbying group composed of doctors, lawyers, and scientists, suggest that the confidentiality problems of the Act were brought to Congress' attention. That Committee
characterized the Attorney General's investigatory powers as "placing in jeopardy the
confidentiality of the patient's record . . . ." Committee for Effective Drug Abuse
Legislation, Pending Drug Abuse Legislation: Fact Sheet, on file in Biddle Law
Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School. How much significance should be attached to the
Committee's failure to win changes in the Attorney General's investigatory powers is
not clear. The Committee was most concerned with securing the transfer to the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare some of the powers given to the Attorney
General in the Administration's bill, and it may be that the Committee did not press
their objections to the Attorney General's investigatory powers sufficiently to bring
them to the attention of the key members of Congress.
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In view of this legislative history it is possible that the Attorney
General's investigatory powers will not be interpreted to include access
to confidential physician-patient communications. The language of the
Act, however, cannot be easily reconciled with such an interpretation.
Consequently, unless courts restrict the Attorney General's investigatory
powers, the Act will probably deter requests for medical assistance for
drug-related medical problems, at least if a significant portion of the
drug-taking community acquires knowledge of the Act's provisions pertaining to investigatory powers. The most obvious means of avoiding
this deterrent effect is to amend the federal drug laws quickly so that
the Attorney General's investigatory powers clearly do not permit him
to compel testimony about confidential physician-patient communications or to gain access to records thereof. A more expeditious alternative, but one less satisfactory given the suspicious attitudes of many
drug users, would be for the Attorney General to announce that he will
not attempt to use his investigatory powers to compel testimony about
confidential physician-patient communications or to gain access to
records thereof.
C. Methadone Maintenance Programs
The third aspect of federal law deals with the legal problems of
methadone maintenance programs for heroin addicts. Under these
programs, which exist in most large cities, heroin addicts are given daily
doses of methadone. Methadone, a synthetic, addicting opiate, is said
to block the action of heroin, eliminate the craving that drives many
former addicts to resume use of the drug, and produce neither euphoria
nor distortion of behavior. It is an addicting drug, however. The
treatment goal of methadone maintenance programs, therefore, is to
draw the addict out of the illegal drug subculture and away from a life
of crime and to help him cope productively with his new environment.
Having realized these objectives, many programs try to end the patient's
methadone dependence by gradually reducing the daily dosage.'
Although methadone has other recognized medical uses, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has taken the position that with regard to methadone as a maintenance drug there is not yet available "substantial evidence of long-term safety and effectiveness . . . under the

Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act standards for the general marketability of new drugs." 84 Nevertheless, the use of methadone as a maintenance drug can qualify for the investigational exemption to the new83 See generally Cole, supra note 1; Note, Methadone Maintenance for Heroin
Addicts, 78 YAIE L.J. 1175 (1969).
8436 Fed. Reg. 6075 (1971) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.44(a)) ; see 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (1964); id. § 321(p) (Supp. V, 1970); 21 C.F.R. § 130.1(h) (5) (1971).
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drug approval requirement.85 A recent FDA regulation states that to
qualify for an investigational exemption, the sponsor of the methadone
maintenance program must obtain the approval of both the FDA and
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. To obtain this approval
the sponsor must file a protocol describing in detail the contemplated
procedures for his maintenance program and must assure, among other
things, that records "of all observations and other data pertinent to the
investigation on each individual treated" are maintained and made
available for inspection by authorized FDA agents. The regulation
further provides: "The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is
also authorized to inspect these records under the Harrison Narcotic
Act."

86

When a substantially similar FDA regulation was proposed
earlier, 87 it provoked objection to many of its provisions, including the
requirement that records be made available for inspection."8 The usual
ground for objection to the latter requirement was that it constituted
an unjustified invasion of the confidential relationship between doctor
and patient." In terms of the particular concerns of this Article, the
recordkeeping and inspection requirements could have especially unfortunate effects. Almost every entrant into a methadone maintenance
program is a recent user of heroin. He is therefore a potential subject
of federal or state prosecution, or, perhaps more likely, of an intimidating and unpleasant interrogation by law enforcement personnel to elicit
his source of supply. It is reasonable to expect, consequently, that some
prospective participants will be deterred from joining a methadone program by fear of revelation of even their identities and certainly of their
medical histories as the FDA regulation allows.
In issuing the final regulation without significant change in the
recordkeeping and inspections requirements contained in the proposed
rule, Commissioner Edwards of the FDA attempted to justify the
availability of records to FDA personnel by noting that reports of
adverse reaction to long-term intake of methadone may require identification of other patients, presumably to warn them of possible similar
adverse effects. " But FDA regulations regarding other new drug
8521 U.S.C. §355(i) (1964).
8636 Fed. Reg. 6077 (1971) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §130.44(d)). The
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, revising a long held position that the
prescription or administration of narcotics in a way maintaining addiction violated
federal drug laws, now recognizes the legality of methadone maintenance programs
receiving a new drug investigational exemption from the Food and Drug Administration. 36 Fed. Reg. 6081 (1971) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 151.411); see Note,
Methadone Maintenance for Heroin Addicts, supra note 83.
8735 Fed. Reg. 9014 (1970).
8836 Fed. Reg. 6075 (1971).
89 Id.

SOId.
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investigations, although generally requiring that records of the investigation be available for FDA inspection, specifically provide that "[t] he
names of the [patients] need not be divulged . . . . " except in special
circumstances." In these cases the FDA apparently believes that, when
adverse reactions are reported, notification to the investigators, usually
physicians, dispensing the drug is sufficient to channel the necessary
information to the research subjects. No justification was offered for
treating methadone maintenance investigations differently.
The statement in the FDA regulations that the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is authorized to inspect these records
under the Harrison Narcotic Act is only partly correct and in one
respect quite misleading. The Harrison Narcotic Act did require
physicians dispensing narcotics, such as methadone, to maintain records
showing the amount dispensed, the date, and the name and address of
the patient, and to make these records available for inspection by the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. 9 Apparently, however,
there was an exception if the physician directly administered the
narcotic, a procedure used in many methadone programs. 3 Moreover,
that Act did not require a physician to maintain and make available
for inspection other records such as medical histories, although the
FDA regulation so implies. The FDA regulation is also misleading
in that although the Harrison Narcotic Act was in effect when the
regulation became effective, April 2, 1971, it was replaced on May 1,
1971,' with the Controlled Substances Act, 95 which differs in relevant
respects. Specifically, a physician now need not maintain records with
regard to the prescribing or administering of certain narcotics, including
methadone, "in the lawful course of his professional practice." " Addi9121 C.F.R. § 130.3(a) (12) (6) (e) (1971) ; see id. § 130.3(a) (13) (4).(e). The
special circumstances are when "the records of the particular subjects require a more
detailed study of the cases, or [when] there is reason to believe that the records do
not represent actual studies or do not represent actual results obtained." Id. § 130.3
(a) (12) (6) (e).
The Bureau
02 Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 551, 567 (repealed 1971).
of Narcotics was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Justice Department in 1968. 33 Fed. Reg. 5611 (1968).
93 Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 551 (repealed 1971) ("except such as
may be dispensed . . . to a patient upon whom such physician . . . shall personally
").
attend . .
94 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 §§ 1101

(b) (3), 1105(a), Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1292, 1295.
95
See Controlled Substances Act §704(a), Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1284
(1970).
9 Controlled Substances Act § 307(c) (1) (A), 21 U.S.C.A. § 827(c) (1) (A)
(Supp. 1971). A recent regulation requires that the physician maintain records,
including the names of recipients, with respect to such narcotics if he dispenses them
"other than by prescribing or administering." 36 Fed. Reg. 7790, 7793 (1971) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 304.03(b), 304.24(d)). This requirement may include the dispensing of narcotics directly to recipients for self-administration, such as commonly
occurs in methadone maintenance programs. Cf. Controlled Substances Act §307(c)
(1) (B), 21 U.S.C.A. § 827(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 1971).
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tionally, as noted previously, the Attorney General can now authorize
persons engaged in research to withhold the names of research subjects,
and a person so authorized cannot be compelled to reveal such information in any proceeding, presumably including one conducted by the
FDA.9 The FDA regulation failed to discuss these provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, which were then soon to be and are now
the applicable law.
If it is considered desirable to remove the infringement imposed
by the FDA regulation on doctor-patient confidentiality within methadone maintenance programs, the only effective remedy is either to
convince the Attorney General to authorize the withholding of names
-under the provision just noted, or to enact legislation." The FDA
Commissioner, although not compelled to require that records identifying methadone program participants be maintained and held available
for inspection, was apparently acting within his delegated powers in
doing so. 9 The case for confidentiality is nevertheless strong. Methadone maintenance is generally recognized as one of the most promising
methods available for treating heroin addicts. Moreover, the risk that
the FDA regulation will dissuade some addicts from participating in
such programs cannot be discounted on the ground that programs have
operated for several years without ironclad assurances of confidentiality.
Certain types of addicts-for example, those who believe they are not
known by the police as heroin users-may be deterred even if others
are not, md these addicts may be the most susceptible to rehabilitation
through methadone maintenance. Particularly given the research goals
the FDA imposes on methadone programs, it would seem unfortunate
to discount this possibility until there is convincing evidence that the
recordkeeping aspects of the FDA regulation have no serious impact on
the willinguess of heroin addicts to accept methadone treatment.
There are, of course, costs to law enforcement in guaranteeing

-confidentiality. If, however, law enforcement officials were to prosecute
participants in maintenance programs for past heroin use, or even to
interrogate them about past sources of supply, the deterrent to participation could be almost total. This law-enforcement interest must be
sacrificed, therefore, unless treatment- and rehabilitation-objectives are
97

See 21 U.S.C.A. §872(c) (Supp. 1971) ; text

accompanying

note 79 supra.

98s
Even if the Controlled Substances Act were interpreted so as not to provide
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs direct access to the records of a
methadone maintenance program, there would be nothing to prevent the Food and
Drug Administration, which clearly would have access to these records, from forwarding them to the Bureau.
s9 See 21 U.S.C. §355(i) (3) (1964). But see id. §355(j) (1) (1964) ("regulations and orders issued . . . under subsection (i) . . . shall have due regard for
").
the professional ethics of the medical profession and the interests of patients . .
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to be substantially foregone. A more realistic law enforcement interest
in access to the names of participants is preventing diversion of methadone into illegal markets. There are other techniques for limiting diversion possibilities, however. For example, the FDA regulation already
lists in its "suggested" protocol for methadone maintenance programs a
statement that a program will conduct frequent urine checks on participants to insure against continued heroin usage.'
This control, if
administered properly, prevents a participant from continuing his heroin
use while diverting his entire methadone allotment into the illegal
market in order to raise money to purchase heroin. Reliance should be
put on controls like these, which do not jeopardize confidentiality, until
there is reason to believe they are not being administered properly or
for some other reason are not preventing the illegal diversion of
methadone. Then, perhaps, but only then, should the FDA and the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs have access to the names
of program participants.1"'
II. STATE LAW
Many changes could be made in the laws of the various states to
buttress the confidentiality of physician-patient relationships. The
changes discussed here are those that, on the basis of my own involvement in this area, seem the most important ones common to a number
of states.
A. Physician-PatientPrivilege in State Courts
Perhaps the most visible need for change in state law is for the
establishment or broadening of a testimonial privilege for physicianpatient communications. Several states have no doctor-patient privilege
at all, and others have created exceptions so broad that the privilege is
essentially unavailable to the patient with medical problems related to
drug abuse.102 Even in states with a broad doctor-patient privilege,
ambiguities about its scope may remain. For example, in Wisconsin
100 36 Fed. Reg. 6077 (1971) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.44(c) (6) (E) (2)).
The FDA regulation imposes numerous other controls with similar objectives on
methadone maintenance programs. Indeed, one purpose of requiring prior approval by
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of proposed methadone programs is
to insure that the contemplated procedures will "prevent diversion of [methadone]
into illicit channels . . . . " Id. 6075 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.44).
101 The scheme proposed here, therefore, would resemble the record-availability
requirements that the FDA imposes on most other new drug investigations. See note
91 supra & accompanying text. These procedures should also be sufficient to protect
FDA's access to accurate information about the medical results of a methadone
maintenance program so that it can evaluate the safety and effectiveness of methadone
maintenance for treating heroin addiction.
02
See C. DEWrra, supra note 22, at 447-71.
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it is unclear whether the privilege applies to communications made to,
or in the presence of, auxiliary medical personnel, such as nurses, medical students, and technicians.""3 There seems no basis for treating
auxiliary medical personnel operating under the direction of a physician
differently from the physician himself, and legislation should be enacted
in these states to ensure that result, at least when it regards a drug
abuse problem.' 0 4
If a state presently does not protect the confidentiality of physicianpatient communications concerning drug abuse, the question whether a
privilege should be provided is more difficult. A decision to permit a
privilege seems the wiser choice because a rehabilitation approach offers
more promise for a long-term solution to drug abuse problems than
does the long-tried law-enforcement approach, and the potential impediment to effective law enforcement posed by the privilege should be a
cost worth bearing. But if a state retains a strong commitment to a
law-enforcement approach, then the effect of a privilege on law enforcement becomes important, for the states more commonly undertake
activity directed at illegal drug users than does the federal government.
The extent to which a privilege would impede the successful prosecution
of mere users is the major issue."0 5 Although there is no conclusive
empirical evidence available on this issue, most prosecutions are for
possession, not use, of illegal drugs."0 6 Thus it seems unlikely that prosecutions would be significantly affected. Also, because there are more
prosecutions of drug users at the state than the federal level, omission of
a physician-patient privilege at the state level is more likely to deter requests for medical assistance. If the decision whether to provide a
privilege is to be made by balancing the needs of law-enforcement and
rehabilitation approaches to drug abuse, therefore, the need for a rehabilitation approach seems to weigh more heavily.
103 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.21 (1966); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kozlowsid,
226 Wis. 641, 276 N.W. 300 (1938).
104 Another prevalent exception in state laws is embodied in UTmoPm NARcoTic
DRUG AcT § 17(2) (1932) : "Information communicated to a physician in an effort
unlawfully to procure a narcotic drug, or unlawfully to procure the administration
of any such drug, shall not be deemed a privileged communication." This exception
may be a justifiable one, for without the testimony of physicians it would be nearly
impossible for the state to enforce the law prohibiting acquisition of narcotic drugs
in the manner indicated. Thus the state's interest in preventing concealment of the
truth is much stronger than it is with regard to the ordinary narcotics offense, where
the state has many ways other than from the testimony of physicians to collect the
necessary evidence.
105 Perhaps consideration should also be given in such a state to the possible
impact of a privilege on investigations of drug law violations by law-enforcement
officials. A privilege may hinder efforts to obtain the voluntary cooperation of
physicians in providing names of drug users, and state officials may be more inclined
than federal officials to use this investigative strategy. Because of the impact on
rehabilitation and treatment of drug abusers, however, on balance a privilege still
seems desirable. See text accompanying notes 117-18 infra.
1O

See text following note 41 mtpra.
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Determining how extensive to make a state privilege would involve
considerations similar to those at the federal level. If a state is unwilling to provide a general physician-patient privilege because of a
belief that such a broad privilege is too often abused in civil cases, a
privilege could be established only for communications regarding drug
abuse. If this limited privilege is to be any broader, its scope might be
determined by considering whether the absence of a privilege for the
particular communications is likely to deter resort to medical personnel.
A limited privilege could be even further restricted so as not to apply
in certain civil proceedings 107 or even to apply only to communications
by patients seeking medical assistance in stopping a drug habit, although
as I have argued previously, the latter restriction is probably undesirable."' 8
Discussion of possible state testimonial privileges for physicianpatient communications should include discussion of the proposed Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Recently promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, this
statute is designed to make laws on narcotic and dangerous drug use
more uniform and to harmonize them with the new federal Controlled
Substances Act. °9 Many of the provisions of the proposed Uniform
Act are identical or quite similar to the federal law, including a provision authorizing the appropriate state officials to make administrative
inspections of hospitals and most doctors' offices."-' One provision.
however, which has no counterpart in the federal Act, deals directly
with the question of a physician-patient privilege. It provides:
A practitioner engaged in medical practice or research is
not required or compelled to furnish the name or identity of
a patient or research subject to the [appropriate person or
agency], nor may he be compelled in any State or local civil.
07
See note 59 supra.
108 Text accompanying and following notes 50-51 supra.
109 There is reason to believe that the statute was promulgated by the National

'

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the urging of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. President Nixon announced about two years ago
that the Department of Justice was drafting a model statute regulating narcotics and
dangerous drugs. See 1969 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 57-A. To date, nothing has been
published by the Department of Justice. The reporter for the committee which
drafted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, however, was Michael Sonnenreich,
an employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
110 Compare UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 502 (1970) with Controlled
Substances Act § 510, 21 U.S.C.A. § 880 (Supp. 1971). There is no provision for
administrative hearings and subpoenas, presumably because the Uniform Act contemplates that state law will classify controlled substances by simply following the federal
classifications. See UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 201 (1970). Nor does
the Uniform Act suggest that a state set quotas on the manufacture of controlled
substances. The federal Act provides for administrative hearings and subpoenas
principally to facilitate acquisition of information as to which classification to assign
a drug and what quotas to set for its manufacture. See notes 68-73 supra & accompanying text.

DRUG ABUSE CONTROL

criminal, administrative, legislative or other proceedings to
furnish the name or identity of an individual that the practitioner is obligated to keep confidential."1
For several reasons this provision is neither as clear nor as broad
as I believe a privilege statute should be. First, "practitioner" is so
defined in the proposed Uniform Act as to permit the interpretation that
it does not apply to receptionists, some nurses, and other auxiliary
medical personnel who become privy to confidential information while
acting under the supervision of a practitioner.11 2 Secondly, technically
the provision only protects the name or identity of the patient; the
provision might be interpreted as inapplicable to other information
about a patient, such as the drugs he used, the general area in which he
lives, and so forth. The availability of this type of information could
significantly deter resort to medical assistance, since some of the information could be used by law enforcement agencies to help identify
the patient or close friends using drugs.
Thirdly, the privilege is limited to instances in which the practitioner is "obligated" to keep confidential the name or identity of a
patient. The provision and the drafting committee's comments are silent
as to whether "obligated" is limited to a statutory obligation or includes
also an obligation resting on a professional or personal code of ethics.
The former interpretation would render the need for this section merely
preservative of established privilege statutes and so of arguable utility.
On the other hand, another section of the proposed Uniform Act may
be read to suggest that indeed only a statutory obligation will suffice.
That section provides that researchers authorized by the appropriate
person or agency cannot be compelled in legal proceedings to identify
the individuals who are the subjects of research."3 Since the proposed
Uniform Act includes within its definition of "practitioner" a "person
. . . permitted to . . . conduct research with respect to . . . a con-

trolled substance," 14 the section specifically protecting researchers is
unnecessary if a nonstatutory code of ethics creates an obligation to
respect confidentiality under the general privilege section, assuming any
nonstatutory code would prevent authorized researchers from divulging
subjects' names. Perhaps the sensible interpretation of the general
privilege statute is to construe "obligated" to include nonstatutory, in111 UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCEs AcT
112

§ 504(c) (1970).

See id. § 101 (t). In contrast, the Iowa statute previously referred to extends

the privilege to a "medical practitioner or any employee or person acting under his
direction . . . ." IOWA CODE ANN. §224A.2 (Supp. 1971).
113UN-IORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT §508(d) (1970).

14 Id. § 101 (t).

962

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.119:933

stitutionally formulated codes of ethics," 5 but not purely personal codes
of ethics. Under such an interpretation a physician would be "obligated" by the code of ethics promulgated by a recognized medical
association even if the state does not have a statutory physician-patient
privilege.
Finally, the general privilege section only speaks of the practitioner not being compelled to testify. Most privileges also provide
that the practitioner may not voluntarily testify without the patient's
consent. If the omission of the latter provision is considered significant, then a physician not bound by a typical physician-patient privilege
statute to respect confidential communications could testify even if he
could not be compelled to do so. Since a patient often has no effective
remedy if his physician violates a medical code of ethics by revealing
confidential communications,1 16 this result could deter requests for
medical assistance where, as with drug abuse, the consequences to the
patient of revealing a confidential communication could be severe.
In short, if a state should seriously consider adoption of the proposed Uniform Controlled Substances Act-and it seems likely that
many will-it should not rely on that statute for a physician-patient
privilege regarding drug abuse. The only section mentioning a privilege is worded in an extremely confused manner, and indeed it may
appear to protect confidential communications while in fact being but a
saving clause for protections which already exist in a state in which the
statute is enacted.
B. Voluntary Reporting of Drug Abusers
Perhaps the most needed change in state laws results because some
physicians and hospitals voluntarily notify the police when approached
by a drug user for treatment of a drug-related medical problem. Such
conduct violates few state privilege statutes since those statutes usually
apply solely to testimony in court and in other official proceedings.
Nevertheless, such actions probably have a greater chilling effect on the
willingness of drug users to seek medical assistance than any official
conduct. 117 Voluntary reporting may cause the police to investigate a
patient's activities and uncover sufficient evidence of illegal drug use to
justify a criminal prosecution. More often, the doctor's notification
subjects the patient to frightening and unpleasant interrogation by police
officers attempting to discover the drug source.
115 Alternatively, a practitioner might be considered "obligated" to respect confidentiality only if a licensing statute requires him not to reveal professional secrets.
See note 119 infra & accompanying text.
3l6But cf. notes 119-25 infra & accompanying text.
7
3. See note 15 supra.
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If treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers is to be emphasized at the state level, this particular deterrent to requesting medical
assistance for drug-related medical problems should be removed. The
mere existence of the problem, however, suggests that many state lawenforcement officials, unlike federal officials, have relied on information
supplied by physicians, because the practice probably would not persist
if the police failed to act on the information received or actively discouraged such communications. On the other hand, the substantial
chilling effect of this practice on the willingness of drug abusers to seek
medical assistance suggests that reliance on physicians for information
about drug users is a self-defeating law-enforcement strategy: its principal effect will not be to provide law-enforcement officials with many
names of drug users but to keep abusers away from physicians and
hospitals-an effect seemingly perceived by many reporting doctors and
hospitals."' Accordingly, a state's commitment to law-enforcement
solutions to the drug abuse problem should not be hindered by forbidding such reporting. If a state has any commitment at all to a
treatment- and rehabilitation-approach to drug abuse, it should take
measures to prevent physicians and hospitals from voluntarily communicating information about drug-using patients. Law-enforcement
agencies would remain free to use other investigative techniques, such
as informers, for learning the identity of drug-law violators, including
those violators who request medical assistance.
There are a number of possible approaches to stopping this practice. The most satisfactory approach would be simply to educate
physicians and hospitals about the undesirable consequences of such
action and in this way persuade them to stop. With increasing emphasis, both within the medical profession and elsewhere, on treatment and
rehabilitation of drug abusers, this approach has considerable promise.
In Madison, Wisconsin, for example, one hospital which formerly often
notified the police when a drug user came to the emergency room for
treatment of a bad trip has recently been persuaded to change its
practice.
Another approach is to encourage the victims of this practice to
attempt legal action against the offending physician or hospital. To my
knowledge, no drug abuser reported to the police after requesting
medical treatment has brought suit against a physician or hospital, but
if physicians and hospitals realized that such actions were a significant
possibility, police notification might diminish quickly. There are
several possible theories on which a drug abuser could proceed.
I's Id.
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Perhaps the most effective action against physicians is to initiate
proceedings for suspension or revocation of their licenses to practice.
Most states provide for suspension or revocation for "unprofessional
conduct," or similarly defined behavior. The nature of such conduct is
not always defined in the statutes." 9 Since medical codes of ethics
generally stress the importance of honoring the confidentiality of doctorpatient communications, however, it should be possible to convince a
decisionmaker that unnecessarily revealing the identity of a patient is
unprofessional conduct. State procedures for revoking medical licenses
vary, of course, and it may be that in some states a victim of a
physician's notification of the police can only file a complaint with the
licensing agency. In Wisconsin, though, the statutes provide that the
district attorney "shall" initiate action to revoke a doctor's license upon
receiving a verified complaint that the doctor engaged in unprofessional
conduct." ° This provision was interpreted by one of that state's
attorneys general to impose a mandatory duty upon a district attorney
2 1
to file suit when he receives a verified complaint.1
There are also several legal theories on which a physician or hospital wilfully betraying a professional confidence might be sued for
damages."' Any visit to a physician or hospital creates at least an
implied contract to pay for the services received. In view of the emphasis on confidentiality in medical codes of ethics, a court might be
convinced to imply as one term of that contract a promise not to reveal
If the state has a statute
voluntarily a confidential communication.'
explicitly providing for license revocation for violating professional
111 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.18(1) (d) (1970) defines "immoral or unprofessional
conduct" to include "wilfully betraying a professional secret." An identical statute
has been interpreted very restrictively by one state. See McPheeters v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 130 Cal. App. 297, 284 P. 938 (1930).
120 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.18(2) (1970).
12125 Op. ATrr'Y GEN. Wis. 567 (1936).
122 Admittedly, there might be some difficulty in proving damages in these cases.
Most of the actions which have been brought against physicians for betraying a professional secret have sought damages for mental anguish, loss of reputation, or some
such intangible loss. See Carr v. Shifflette, 82 F.2d 874, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (concurring opinion). Presumably some similar damages claim would have the best
chance for success when the police have been informed of a patient's illegal drug use.
Considerable mental anguish can result from a police interrogation-commonly the
immediate consequence of a physician's notification to the police of a patient's illegal
drug use-especially if the patient is on a "bad trip" at the time. See Madison
Kaleidoscope, supra note 16. Though the problem of jury prejudice looms large, in
a clear case a directed verdict may be possible.
I= See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965) ; Forbes, Professional Confidence, 13 MEDICO-LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL REv. 18
(1945). One court, recognizing, a cause of action for betrayal of a confidential communication also recognized a limited immunity from liability if the communication
was shown to have prevented the spread of contagious disease. Simonsen v. Swenson,
104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) ; see Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d
814 (1958). Whether this immunity should be extended to include the reporting of
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secrets, then a damage action for violation of a statutory standard may
be maintainable. 2 ' Some opinions suggest a physician has a commonlaw duty not to reveal confidential communications unnecessarily and
may be sued in tort in the event of breach. 2 5
Still a third approach to this problem is to enact legislation prohibiting notification of police or others by physicians and hospitals.
The recent Iowa law discussed above provides that physicians, hospitals, and auxiliary medical personnel
shall not report or disclose the name of such person [requesting treatment and rehabilitation for drug addiction or dependency] or the fact that treatment was requested or has
been undertaken to any law enforcement officer or agency
126

Violation results in a fine, not exceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days. 12 7 Although the statute's object
is salutary the penalty chosen is of questionable value. When a
physician or hospital notifies the police, the information will often be
welcomed by them and the prosecuting attorney, and criminal prosecution seems unlikely. Thus, a draftsman would be well advised to include
a civil remedy for the victim of a statutory violation. 28
C. Physicians' Conflicting Loyalties
A third needed change in state law results from a problem similar
in some ways to the problem just discussed. Institutionally employed
physicians are sometimes faced with conflicting obligations to their
criminal conduct to the police has never been litigated in a reported decision. Cf.
AMERICAN MEDicAL Ass'N, PRINcin'rEs OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957):
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of
medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of
patients . . . unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.
124 See Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920).
2
"'
See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965) ; Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917).
In Hammonds it
was also suggested that the relationship between doctor and patient is analogous to
a fiduciary relationship and that a betrayal of confidential communications would be
a breach of that "fiduciary" duty for which an action could be maintained. 243 F.
Supp. at 802.
Invasion of privacy, where the state recognizes such a tort, is another possible
theory. Barber v. Time, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W2d 291 (1942); DeMay v. Roberts,
46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881); cf. Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d
814 (1958).
I26IOWACODE ANN. § 224A.2 (Supp. 1971); see id. § 224A.3.
'2 Id. § 224A.6.
128
In providing a civil remedy, it would be desirable to set a minimum recovery
by statute. In many situations compensatory damages may be difficult to prove and
jury prejudice difficult to overcome, note 122 supra, and absent a minimum recovery
provision a statute might not have the desired deterrent effect.
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employers and to their patients. Examples of physicians in such circumstances are company physicians, if the company's employees are
permitted to consult them about personal medical problems, and
physicians employed by student health centers at universities. There
is some confusion within the medical profession as to whether such
physicians are ethically bound to honor the confidentiality of patient
communications if the information revealed is desired by the physicians'
employers. 9 Obviously, if information that a patient is using illegal
drugs is communicated to a physician's employer, it can result in dismissal of an employee or disciplinary action against a student. As a
result, if the physician is known to report such information to his employer, prospective patients will be deterred from consulting the
physician about drug-related medical problems.
For essentially the same reasons that physicians should be prohibited from notifying the police when approached by drug users, it
would be desirable policy to require institutionally employed physicians
to refrain from notifying their employers of drug-related communications made to them. Such a policy would not prevent employers and
universities from detecting violations of their rules in other ways, and
might encourage more drug abusers to seek medical assistance.
Fortunately, this viewpoint is being adopted voluntarily, particularly
at universities. At the University of Wisconsin, for example, the
student health center, with the blessing of the university administration,
never relays drug-related information communicated in confidence by
a patient either to the police or to university authority. The policies
at some universities, however, may be less salutary. For example, a
pamphlet published by the California Institute of Technology in 1969
promises confidentiality for disclosures made to health center personnel
and specifically states that "information disclosed to Health Center personnel . . .will not be available to be used in any way as the basis for

any disciplinary or administrative action." '
however, the pamphlet observes:

Two paragraphs later,

In case of serious drug effects, the Health Center will be
concerned, as it is with any serious medical condition, in determining what course of action will best serve the student's
129 See Willig, Legal Rights of Employees, Physician and Company, in DRUG
65 (W. Stewart ed. 1970); Smith, Physician's Duty to Patient

ABUSE IN INDUSTRY

. . . to Company, in id. 81. One commentator argues that no confidentiality obligation arises if the physician is merely investigating on behalf of a third person
(for instance, a medical test required as part of a job application), but that an
obligation does arise if the physician begins advising or treating the patient. C.
DEWIT, .ntpra note 22, at 114-16. Obviously this distinction is not always easily
applied.
130 California Institute of Technology, Drugs and the Caltech Student 28 (1969)
(student information pamphlet).
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own interests and will minimize the risk of future mentalhealth difficulties. For this reason, any student who is
hospitalized for treatment of drug effects will be readmitted
to the Institute only after certification by the Student Health
Center that the individual appears to be fully recovered and
capable of performing Institute work normally. Students who
are not hospitalized but who, in the judgment of the Director
of Health Services, are unable to perform satisfactorily because of the effects of drug use may be placed on either
voluntary or involuntary medical leave from the Institute,
subject to return under the same conditions as following a
hospitalization.' 3'
If informal approaches are not successful in establishing the confidentiality of drug-related information communicated to an institutionally employed physician, other remedies should be sought. The
patient might be able to use some of the remedies suggested above if
a physician contacted the police.'
The conflicting loyalties of the
physician, however, make less clear the physician's obligation under
existing law not to convey the information, and consequently courts
may be reluctant to uphold such a cause of action. 3 The other possible
solution, of course, is legislation to prohibit communication of information pertaining to drug abuse to anyone, including the physician's
employer, if it is obtained in the context of a physician-patient
relationship.
D. ParentalConsent
The final needed state-law change to be discussed here derives
from the special legal problems that confront a physician when a minor
requests medical attention. To avoid an action for battery, a physician
or hospital must, whenever possible, obtain the consent of the patient
to the treatment proposed.'3 4 If the patient is a minor, statutorily disabled from consenting, the parent or guardian must consent.' 35 Yet
many under-age drug abusers very much desire that information about
their drug abuse not be communicated to their parents. Often, a
physician will resolve this conflict by neglecting to obtain the parent's
131 Id. 29.
13 2
See notes 122-25 .supra & accompanying text.
133 Some cases have allowed a physician a limited privilege to reveal confidential
communications. See sources cited in note 123 mtpra.
13 4
See W. PRossmz, TORTS § 18, at 104 (3d ed. 1964).
'35 B. SHARTEL & M. PLANT, THE LAw oF MEDIcAL PRAcTic 25-26 (1959).
See also Comment, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970 Wis.
L. RFv. 879; Note, Restructuring Inforned Consent: Legal Therapy for the DoctorPatientRelationship, 79 YALE LJ. 1533 (1970).
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consent, particularly if the indicated medical treatment is routine.'
Most physicians, even in university-sponsored student health centers,
however, will either notify the parents if the medical situation becomes
complicated,"' or refuse to treat a minor patient beyond a certain point
unless he obtains parental consent. To the extent this policy is known,
it can only operate to deter minor drug abusers from seeking medical
assistance for drug-related problems.
An obvious solution to this problem is to enact legislation making
legally effective a minor's consent to treatment for drug-related medical
problems. Iowa, again setting an example, has done something similar
by providing that a minor can give effective legal authorization for
38
treatment and rehabilitation of drug addiction or dependency.
Massachusetts has recently enacted a similar law.'
A few other states
have enacted statutes which permit minors to consent to treatment for
other medical problems, such as pregnancy or venereal disease, about
which minors often prefer their parents not learn.1' Objections will
probably be made that such legislation interferes with a parent's relationship with his child and prevents the parent from helping to resolve
the social and emotional problems that typically accompany such medical
problems. If the knowledge that a physician may convey confidential
communications to a minor's parents deters minors from seeking
medical assistance, however, failure to enact consent legislation will
result both in parents' remaining in ignorance of their children's problems, and thus disabled from providing social and emotional guidance,
and in minors' not receiving important medical assistance. For these
reasons, statutes authorizing minors to consent to treatment for drugrelated problems are eminently sensible, and other states ought to
adopt them.
136 Cf. Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906).
137 See California Institute of Technology, supra note 130, at 28:
In the case of a minor student, Health Center authorities may sometimes
have a responsibility to notify parents if they consider this necessary, but even
this step will not be taken without the student's permission unless the situation
is such that the Health Center authorities feel they have no alternative.
Despite its reassuring tone, the equivocation of this sentence is astounding on careful
reading.
13 8
IoWA CODE ANN. § 224A.2 (Supp. 1971). The same section provides explicitly
that the physician shall not inform the minor's parents about the minor's drug addiction or dependency without his consent. Criminal sanctions are provided for violation
of this prohibition. Id. § 224A.6.
-13 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12E (Supp. 1971) (legalizing consent to treatment by minor found "drug dependent" by two physicians).
140 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 18.1, 18.4, 18.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970)
(minor may consent to treatment of pregnancy or venereal disease, but parents may

be notified); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135 (1971) (same, but if pregnancy or
venereal disease is not diagnosed, parents may not be notified).
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CONCLUSION

A law-enforcement approach to drug abuse problems is no longer
perceived as the sole or even necessarily the best approach to solving
the problems such activity presents society. Because it is based upon
a deterrent approach to deviant behavior, the operation of such a scheme
tends to cause offenders to avoid situations which may lead to detection
of their behavior by potentially disapproving authorities, such as police
and employers.
If a treatment-and-rehabilitation approach is to be given a fair
chance, laws with such deterrent effects must at least not depend on the
cooperation of those attempting to treat the offender. Implicit in the
recognition of a treatment approach is toleration of drug use when
recourse to treatment or rehabilitation is attempted. The legal changes
suggested in this Article will not solve the entire drug-abuse problem,
but they may reduce a major impediment to the success of an approach
which holds a great deal of promise.

